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Abstract
We introduce open games as a compositional foundation of eco-
nomic game theory. A compositional approach potentially allows
methods of game theory and theoretical computer science to be
applied to large-scale economic models for which standard eco-
nomic tools are not practical. An open game represents a game
played relative to an arbitrary environment and to this end we
introduce the concept of coutility, which is the utility generated by
an open game and returned to its environment. Open games are the
morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category and can therefore be
composed by categorical composition into sequential move games
and by monoidal products into simultaneous move games. Open
games can be represented by string diagrams which provide an
intuitive but formal visualisation of the information lows. We show
that a variety of games can be faithfully represented as open games
in the sense of having the same Nash equilibria and of-equilibrium
best responses.
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1 Introduction
The concept of compositionality is well-known and almost com-
monplace in computer science, where it is what ultimately allows
programmers to scale software to large systems. However, in many
other ields compositionality is essentially unknown and hence its
beneits are not available. In this paper we introduce composition-
ality into a ield where one might not believe it to be possible: the
study of strategic games and Nash equilibria. They are of interest
in economics and computer science where optimal decisions are
taken by interacting agents with conlicting goals.
In contrast to classical game theory, where games are studied
monolithically as one global object, compositional game theory
works bottom-up by building large and complex games from smaller
components. Such an approach is inherently di cult since the
interaction between games has to be considered. Moreover, in the
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compositional approach, the equilibria of larger games should be
deined from the equilibria of the component games - but a priori,
there is no reason why this should be possible.
For example, in the prisoner's dilemma game, each player's best
option is to defect, although, if they acted as a single agent, they
would cooperate. Moreover, if the one-shot prisoner's dilemma
game is repeated, then cooperative equilibria become achievable.
More generally, the equilibria of a composite game are not neces-
sarily made up from those of the component games, and locally
optimal moves are not guaranteed to be globally optimal. In essence,
game theory contains emergent efects whereby a composite system
exhibits behaviours that are not (simple) functions of the behaviours
of the components. Accordingly, emergent efects make composi-
tionality very hard to achieve and the existence of a compositional
model of game theory is somewhat surprising. In order to arrive
at this goal we had to radically reformulate classical game theory
from irst principles and rebuild it on open games.
Open games represent the relationship between diferent inter-
actions in two dimensions: in sequence if an interaction follows
another interaction, and in parallel if interactions take place simulta-
neously. As such, we follow a path taken in the ield of open systems
[22], and in particular categorical open systems [6] where composi-
tional approaches to general systems are studied. Here, systems are
modelled as morphisms f : X → Y in a symmetric monoidal cate-
gory, where the objectsX andY describe the boundaries of the open
system, where it interacts with its environment. This means that
systems f : X → Y and f ′ : X ′ → Y ′ can be composed in parallel
using the monoidal product to yield f ⊗ f ′ : X ⊗X ′ → Y ⊗Y ′, and
two systems f : X → Y and д : Y → Z sharing a common bound-
ary can be composed sequentially by glueing along this boundary
to yield д ◦ f : X → Z . Ordinary, closed systems are recovered
as scalars [1], i.e. endomorphisms f : I → I of the monoidal unit,
which represents a trivial boundary. Open games are accordingly
the morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category.
A compositional model of game theory does not only have to
model a game but also the interactions of the game with all other
games and environments. This can be seen as a form of continuation
passing style. This would still be hardly tractable if the environ-
ment of an open game included arbitrary other open games. The
crucial technical feature underlying our approach is to describe the
behaviour of an open game relative to a simpliied notion of an en-
vironment which we call a context, in which the future is abstracted
into a single utility function. In this way, we reduce an arbitrarily
complex game to a set of individual decisions. The circularity of a
Nash equilibrium, where all players play mutually best replies, is
inally handled by the composition operators.
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The theory of open games is based on two main predecessors.
Firstly, in [18] games are deined as processes and in [2] the dynam-
ics but not the equilibria are treated compositionally. The second
predecessor is the theory of higher order games and selection func-
tions, for example in [4] and [13], which give a theory of equilibria
relative to an environment but are not strongly compositional. (Se-
lection functions can however be used to model goals of agents
compositionally [12].) Combining features of these approaches into
a single theory required the innovations mentioned above and led
us to discover the idea of an open game. After we developed open
games, connections to lenses and the geometry of interaction were
noticed respectively by Jeremy Gibbons and Tom Hirschowitz.
Although compositional game theory is partly inspired by game
semantics, there is little technical overlap beyond monoidal cate-
gories. Game semantics avoids several di cult deining features of
game theory by restricting to the 2-player zero-sum setting, which
leads to more richly structured (typically ∗-autonomous) categories.
In [11] morphisms between open games are deined to capture rela-
tive Nash equilibria, directly inspired by relative winning strategies
in game semantics, and this leads to deeper connections between
open games and game semantics than are apparent from this paper.
We omit proofs in this paper, which can be found in [9] and
[11]. We also work over the category of sets to keep notation and
overheads to a minimum ś for a more categorical account, see once
more [9]. The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The next
section introduces selection functions as a key ingredient of open
games. Section 3 introduces the deinition of an open game and
discusses its elements, followed by some examples in Section 4. The
monoidal category of open games is introduced in Section 5 and the
string diagrams attached to this category in Section 6. We inally
turn to examples built compositionally: in Section 7 we discuss
simultaneous move games and in Section 8 sequential move games.
Section 9 concludes the paper with an outlook on further work.
2 Selection functions and higher order games
For reasons of space, we assume the reader knows some basic
game theory, such as the deinitions of normal-form and extensive-
form games and Nash equilibrium. These basic concepts can be
found for example in [14] or many online lecture notes. Neverthless,
in this section we introduce enough game theory via selection
functions [4, 13] to make the paper self contained.
Deinition 2.1. An n-player higher order simultaneous move game
is deined by the following data:
• For each player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a set Xi of choices
• A set R of outcomes
• An outcome function q :
∏n
i=1 Xi → R
• For each player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a multi-valued selection function
δi : (Xi → R) → P (Xi )
In this game, each player simultaneously makes a choice of move
xi : Xi . We deine a (pure) strategy for player i to be just a choice
in Xi , and a (pure) strategy proile to be a tuple of strategies in
Σ :=
∏n
i=1 Xi . When all choices are made, the rules of the game
determine an outcome q(x1, . . . ,xn ) : R. The selection function
δi : (Xi → R) → P (Xi ) deines the set of moves δi (k ) that are
considered optimal in a context k : Xi → R, which describes the
individual decision faced by player i . A context for player i is ob-
tained from the outcome function by ixing strategies for all other
players and is thus the utility function associating, to each poten-
tial unilateral deviation xi of player i , the utility arising from that
deviation.
Given a higher order simultaneous move game, we deine its
best response relation B ⊆ Σ × Σ by (σ ,σ ′) ∈ B if for all players
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have σ ′i ∈ δi (λ(xi : Xi ).q(σ [i 7→ xi ])), where
σ [i 7→ xi ] is the strategy proile σ apart from the ith player who
chooses xi or, more formally,
(σ [i 7→ xi ])j =

xi if i = j
σj otherwise
(In game theory this is usually written (σ ′i ,σ−i ), but we prefer the
more precise notation of computer science.) A selection equilibrium
is a pure strategy proile σ with (σ ,σ ) ∈ B.
The classical deinition of an n-player simultaneous move game
in normal form results from this deinition as the special case in
which the set of outcomes is Rn and the ith player's selection
function is
δi (k ) = argmax(πi ◦ k )
= {x : Xi | (k (x ))i ≥ (k (x
′))i for all x
′ : Xi }
In this case the selection equilibria agree with the usual deinition
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and moreover the best response
relation is the same. There are many well-known examples of 2-
player simultaneous move games with 2 moves each, such as the
prisoner's dilemma, matching pennies, battle of the sexes, chicken,
etc., deined by diferent outcome functions q : {C,D}2 → R2. The
prisoner's dilemma, for example, is given by the outcome function
q(C,C ) = (2, 2) q(C,D) = (0, 3)
q(D,C ) = (3, 0) q(D,D) = (1, 1)
and yields the constant best response relation with (σ , (D,D)) ∈ B
for all strategy proiles σ . This happens because D is a dominant
strategy for both players in the prisoner's dilemma. An extended
example can be found in [13] of a higher order simultaneous move
game whose selection functions are not of this form, which we will
discuss in section 7.
Deinition 2.2. Ann-player higher order sequential game is deined
by the same data as a simultaneous move game: sets X1, . . . ,Xn of
choices, a set R of outcomes, an outcome function q :
∏n
i=1 Xi → R,
and selection functions δi : (Xi → R) → P (Xi ). A strategy for
player i is a function
σi :
i−1∏
j=1
X j → Xi
that chooses a move contingent on the previous moves by other
players, and the set of strategy proiles is the set
Σ =
n∏
i=1
*.
,
i−1∏
j=1
X j → Xi
+/
-
of tuples consisting of a strategy for each player. There is an ob-
vious play function P : Σ →
∏n
i=1 Xi producing the sequence of
moves resulting from a strategy proile, deined by course-of-values
recursion, which in the base case uses
∏0
j=1 X j → X1  X1. Given
a strategy proile σ , we call P(σ ) the strategic play of σ .
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The best response relation B ⊆ Σ×Σ of a higher order sequential
game is deined by (σ ,σ ′) ∈ B if
(P(σ [i 7→ σ ′i ]))i ∈ δi (λ(xi : Xi ).q(Ui (xi ,σ )))
where the unilateral deviation operator Ui is the evident function
Ui : Xi ×Σ →
∏n
j=1 X j deined by course-of-values recursion, with
(Ui (xi ,σ ))i = xi . Strategy proiles σ with (σ ,σ ) ∈ B are called
selection equilibria of the sequential game.
In the case where the selection functions are argmax as deined
above, this agrees with the standard deinitions of best responses
and Nash equilibria. Note that this is a strictly weaker deinition
than that of optimal strategies from [4], which specialises to subgame
perfect equilibrium (a strengthening of Nash equilibrium) when the
selection functions are argmax [5].
3 Open games
The primary objects of study in compositional game theory are
called open games. We start by giving the deinition, and in the
remainder of this section we discuss its interpretation.
Deinition 3.1. Let X , S,Y ,R be sets. An open game G : (X , S ) →
(Y ,R) is deined to be a 4-tuple G = (ΣG , PG ,CG ,BG ), where
• ΣG is a set, called the set of strategy proiles of G
• PG : ΣG × X → Y is called the play function of G
• CG : ΣG × X × R → S is called the coplay function of G
• BG : X × (Y → R) → Rel(ΣG ) is called the best response
function of G
Rel(ΣG ) is the meet-semilattice of all endo-relations R ⊆ ΣG ×
ΣG . In general, we impose no conditions whatsoever on these
components. In practice, however, we are most interested in those
open games which are generated by certain constructions, some of
which are deined in this paper. There are class-many open games of
a ixed type (which causes the category of open games to be locally
large), but only set-many after restricting to those generated by a
set of constructions. (We could also simply bound the cardinality
of ΣG .) We will represent a general open game G : (X , S ) → (Y ,R)
in diagrammatic form (where time lows from left to right) as
X Y
RS
G
In Section 5 we will build on this and discuss the graphical syntax
of open games.
We interpretX as the type of observations that can be made by G
that inform the choice of a strategy and hence action, and Y as the
type of moves or choices. By that a game G is a process that maps
observations X to choices Y . The types R and S , on the other hand,
are ‘dual' or ‘contravariant' types and this is indicated above by
the arrows lowing in the reverse direction. We think of R as the
type of utility (type of values about which the players in G have
preferences) that actions might generate. Thus utility functions
that arise in standard game theory are simply functions Y → R.
The type S is dually called the coutility since it represents values
that are returned to the calling environment by the game so that
they can become utility for other processes. This is seen clearly and
formally within the deinition of composition of open games where
the utility of one game (acting as the environment for the other) is
computed via the coplay function of the other game. We point this
out explicitly when discussing the composition of games.
The most straightforward parts of the deinition of open games
are the irst two components. It is intuitive that a game has a set of
strategy proiles and that, given a strategy proile and an observa-
tion, we can run the strategy proile on the observation to obtain a
choice. To give a simple concrete example, suppose Y = A × B, and
deine
Σ = (X → A) × (X ×A→ B)
and P((σ1,σ2),x ) = (σ1 (x ),σ2 (x ,σ1 (x ))). This represents a two-
player game of perfect information: the value x is the input which
the irst player observes and then chooses a using the strategy σ1.
The second player observes both x and a and chooses b using σ2.
The pair (a,b) is taken to be the output.
To gain an intuition for coplay, let us irst consider a very simple
situation. You receive your monthly income and upon observing
your bonus (your X ), you decide to buy a bottle of champagne. You
go to a wine shop and for the given price, you buy a bottle (your
Y ), which gives you a certain utility (your R). Here, the connection
between choice and reaction, between what you do and what comes
back to you, is rather immediate. Deciding is simple.
Open games model situations where the connection between
your action and what comes back to you is left open - in the same
way as with selection functions: by allowing for all possible con-
texts. The only prerequisite for contexts is being well-typed. Com-
ing back to the example, suppose, instead of buying the bottle
yourself, you give an amount of money to your friend, a cham-
pagne aicionado, with the request to buy a bottle for you. So, your
action gives her some money, and you expect a bottle of champagne
and by that some utility back from her. She observes your bonus
and the amount of money given to her (your Y , her X ), and will
take some action (her Y ) that will bring back a bottle of champagne
from a yet unspeciied environment (her R). Ultimately, she will
hand back a bottle of champagne (her S , your R) which will create
utility for you. This handing back of utility is computed through
her coplay function which computes the coutility to hand back.
Note, in the example we used the concept of utility, which by
deinition is the real number maximised by classical game-theoretic
agents. There is no requirement in the deinition of an open game
that outcomes are either real numbers, or a linear resource such as
money nor that some utility is maximised at all. Indeed, slightly
changing the example, we could have deined coutility as belonging
to a certain set of possible types of wine. This lexibility (which is
inherited from the theory of selection functions) may be seen as a
necessary side-efect of obtaining compositionality, but can itself
be useful in modelling [12, 13].
Possibly the most important part of the deinition is the best
response relation, which is deined relative to an arbitrary context ś
as in the case of games modelled via selection functions. Hence, an
open game also has Nash equilibria relative to an arbitrary context.
A context consists of a state, which says what happened in the past,
and a utility function, expressed as a continuation, which says what
will happen in the future. Compositional game theory relies on
the observation that such relative best response relations provide a
strategic representation of games that can be composed.
Relationship with Lenses: Pairs of functions X → Y and X × R →
S are equivalent to polymorphic lenses (X , S ) → (Y ,R) [10, 19].
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Moreover, all open games can be built from lenses in a way we now
describe. Observe that
• An element x : X is given by a lens (1, 1) → (X , S ), where
1 = {∗}. Call such lenses states St(X , S )
• A function Y → R is a lens (Y ,R) → (1, 1). Call such lenses
costates CoSt(Y ,R)
Lemma 3.2. An open game G : (X , S ) → (Y ,R) is exactly
• A family of lenses, that is a set ΣG and, for each σ : ΣG , a
lens Gσ : (X , S ) → (Y ,R).
• BG : St(X , S ) × CoSt(Y ,R) → Rel(ΣG )
In such a situation, we often save notational overhead by writing
the lens Gσ as σ , as in (X , S )
σ
−→ (Y ,R).
Lenses play a key role in the development of open games as they
hide many details which otherwise severely pollute the presenta-
tion. More concretely, they encapsulate the purely algebraic parts
of open games, leaving us to focus on the strategic behaviour of the
best-response function. They also ensure all reasoning about open
games can take place diagrammatically in the category of lenses.
As a result, more recent work on open games has heavily exploited
this connection [11].
Relationship with Geometry of Interaction: It has been pointed out
to us that there is a connection between the geometry of interaction
(GoI) and open games. A central construction within GoI, the Int-
construction, takes a traced monoidal category C and constructs
another category I (C) whose objects are pairs of objects of C, and
whose morphisms (X , S ) → (Y ,R) are maps X ⊗ R → Y ⊗ S . If C
is cartesian, this is equivalent to two functions X × R → Y and
X × R → S . If the former function does not use the input R, we get
precisely a lens. This restriction means that open games are not
completely symmetric and this explains why a trace operator is
not needed to deine composition Ð one can simply calculate the
forwards/covariant part of the composition and use that to calculate
the backwards/contravariant part.
When the base category is traced cartesian monoidal, both lenses
and the Int-construction are deined, and the two composition
operators agree. This means that there is an identity-on-objects
functor from the category of lenses to I (C), and this suggests it
will be possible to build a more symmetrical theory of open games
with computable strategies.
4 Examples of open games
An open game G : (1, 1) → (1, 1), where 1 = {∗}, consists (up to
isomorphism of sets) of a set ΣG of strategy proiles and a best
response relation BG ⊆ ΣG × ΣG . Since (1, 1) will turn out to be
the monoidal unit of the monoidal category of open games, we call
G a scalar open game, following the terminology of [1].
Any existing notion of ‘game' from which we can deine a best
response function can be encoded as a scalar open game. For ex-
ample, consider the prisoner's dilemma from Section 2. This can
be represented as a scalar open game G : (1, 1) → (1, 1) with
ΣG = {C,D}
2 with the constant best response relation BG deined
by (σ ,σ ′) ∈ BG if σ
′
= (D,D). (The question of how much infor-
mation about a normal-form or extensive-form game is preserved
by the representation as a scalar open game is a subtle one, which
we can unfortunately not discuss here for space reasons.)
In this paper we will show that open games can be used to build
such scalars compositionally. In the remainder of this section we
will deine families of open games that we consider atomic, in the
sense that they are not built compositionally from smaller games.
These families are decisions, functions, and counits.
A decision is an open game that represents a single choice made
by an agent.
Deinition 4.1. LetX andY be sets. A (utility-maximising) decision
D : (X , 1) → (Y ,R) is an open game deined by the following data:
• ΣD = X → Y
• PD (σ ,x ) = σ (x )
• CD (σ ,x , r ) = ∗
• (σ ,σ ′) ∈ BD (x ,k ) if σ
′(x ) ∈ argmaxk
A (pure) strategy for a single decision is a function that maps
possible observations that can be made by the agent, to possible
choices. Such a strategy is considered optimal in the context (x ,k )
if it maps the current state x to a maximising point of the current
continuation k .
The reason that the pre-deviation strategy σ plays no role in
(σ ,σ ′) ∈ BD (x ,k ) is that σ is considered the strategy played by all
other players besides the one currently under consideration, and
so it plays no role in a 1-player open game such as D. Put it in
another way: in a one-player game there is nothing for σ ′ to be a
best response to.
The deinition of a decision assumes an agent who maximises
real-valued utility. However, there is nothing inherent in the def-
inition of an open game that says this must be the case. Indeed,
one can argue that the additional generality is necessary to be com-
positional: An aggregate of two maximising agents, if modelled
as a selection function-like object, is not necessarily maximising.
The prisoner's dilemma is a standard example of an aggregate with
behaviour that is not (globally) maximising, that is to say, if the two
players were modelled as a single entity, they would choose (C,C ).
This is the sense in which selection functions are a theoretical
precursor to open games.
Deinition 4.2. Let X , Y and R be sets, and let δ : (Y → R) →
P (Y ) be a multi-valued selection function. We deine an open game
Dδ : (X , 1) → (Y ,R) by the following data:
• ΣDδ = X → Y
• PDδ (σ ,x ) = σ (x )
• CDδ (σ ,x , r ) = ∗
• (σ ,σ ′) ∈ BDδ (x ,k ) if σ
′(x ) ∈ δ (k )
We will give an example of an open game with non-utility-
maximising decisions in Section 7.
Decisions are the only atomic open games that play a role in
strategic reasoning. We formalise this with the following deinition.
Deinition 4.3. Let G : (X , S ) → (Y ,R) be an open game. We call
G strategically trivial if it satisies the following two conditions:
• |ΣG | = 1 (say, ΣG = {∗})
• (∗, ∗) ∈ BG (x ,k ) for all contexts (x ,k )
The irst condition says that there is exactly one strategy, and
so there is no choice to be made. The second condition says that
this trivial strategy can never fail to be in equilibrium. The idea
behind this is that if a strategy proile fails to be an equilibrium, it
should always be because some player has an incentive to deviate.
Strategically trivial open games could also be called zero-player
open games.
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Deinition 4.4. Let f : X → Y and д : R → S be functions. We
deine a strategically trivial open game ( f ,д) : (X , S ) → (Y ,R) with
play function P(f ,д) (x ) = f (x ) and coplay functionC(f ,д) (∗,x , r ) =
д(r ).
As a special case of this, a function f : X → Y can be ‘lifted' to
an open game in two ways: covariantly as ( f , id1) : (X , 1) → (Y , 1),
or contravariantly as (id1, f ) : (1,Y ) → (1,X ).
The inal class of atomic open games are the counits.
Deinition 4.5. Let X be a set. We deine a strategically trivial
open game εX : (X ,X ) → (1, 1) called a counit, with play function
PεX (∗,x ) = ∗ and coplay function CεX (∗,x , ∗) = x .
Recall that backward-lowing values are ‘teleological', that is,
they are future values about which agents are reasoning. The role
of counits is to identify an ordinary forward-lowing value as the
value about which some past agent is reasoning. This plays an
important role in the diagrammatic language of open games in the
next section. Note there is no dual unit of type (1, 1) → (X ,X )
(the reader might like to try to deine one) which is a relection
of the fact that game theory is not symmetric in its forward and
backward looking facets. Mathematically, open games will not form
a compact closed category.
5 The monoidal category of open games
In this section we will deine a pair of operators for composing
open games, categorical composition and monoidal product, which
correspond to sequential play and simultaneous play. These two
operators make open games into the morphisms of a symmetric
monoidal category (after quotienting by isomorphisms of strategy
sets). As morphisms of a monoidal category open games can also
be denoted by string diagrams, and we introduce this diagrammatic
language in the next section. While these two operators form the
core, we do not claim that they are a complete basis of operators
for building open games in any formal or informal sense. Indeed,
other operators are discussed in [8].
First we give the deinition of categorical composition. This is a
form of sequential composition in which the choice made by the
irst component is hidden, visible only to the second component
but not to the outside. Sequential play is more intuitive when the
choices made by both components are visible; this will be recovered
as a derived operator in Section 8.
Deinition 5.1. Given a pair of open games G : (X , S ) → (Y ,R)
and H : (Y ,R) → (Z ,Q ), we deine their composition H ◦ G :
(X , S ) → (Z ,Q ) as follows. The set of strategy proiles is the carte-
sian product ΣH◦G = ΣG × ΣH . The play function composes
simply by composition of functions:
PH◦G ((σ ,τ ),x ) = PH (τ , PG (σ ,x ))
The coplay function composes as follows:
CH◦G ((σ ,τ ),x ,q) = CG (σ ,x ,CH (τ , PG (σ ,x ),q))
The best response relation ((σ ,τ ), (σ ′,τ ′)) ∈ BH◦G (x ,k ) holds if
(σ ,σ ′) ∈ BG (x ,k
′) and (τ ,τ ′) ∈ BH (PG (σ ,x ),k ), where k
′ : Y →
R is deined by k ′(y) = CH (τ ,y,k (PH (τ ,y))).
Since the set of strategy proiles is usually a tuple consisting
of a strategy for each decision, the condition ΣH◦G = ΣG × ΣH
corresponds roughly to saying that the set of decisions inH ◦ G is
the disjoint union of the decisions in G andH . The play function
says that to play the sequential compositionH ◦ G in state x with
strategy proile (σ ,τ ), we irst play G with σ in state x , obtaining
a state y forH , which we then play with τ .
The formula for composing coplay functions is hard to under-
stand intuitively, but successfully captures the informal intuition
given for coplay in section 3. Alternatively, it can be seen as com-
position of lenses [10].
Finally, we give the conditions for a strategy proile (σ ′,τ ′) to be
a best response to (σ ,τ ) in a context (x ,k ). This means that for each
player in G, σ ′ must be rational assuming that all other players in
G play σ and all players inH play τ , and also that for each player in
H , τ ′ must be rational assuming that all players in G play σ and all
other players inH play τ . (This is Nash equilibrium-like reasoning.)
We can apply the compositionally-known best response relations
for G andH , after using these assumptions to appropriately modify
the context. ForH the continuation remains k , and the state x is
modiied to PG (σ ,x ) using the assumption that players in G play
σ . For G the state remains x , and the continuation is modiied to k ′,
using the interpretation of the coplay function CH as the utility
passed backward fromH to G, with the assumption that players
inH play τ .
Open games trivially cannot form a category, because this com-
position operator is not associative on the nose: the strategy proiles
are
ΣI◦(H◦G) = (ΣG × ΣH ) × ΣI
, ΣG × (ΣH × ΣI ) = Σ(I◦H )◦G
There are three approaches to this problem. The irst, which is
perfectly successful in practice, is to simply ignore it and informally
work up to isomorphic strategy sets. The second, which is attractive
from a theoretical point of view, is to deine a bicategory of open
games in which the 2-cells are functions between strategy sets
that suitably commute with the remaining structure. The reason
we do not take this approach is that monoidal bicategories are
notoriously complicated, and generalising to a monoidal double
category (whose axioms are typically much easier to verify [21])
would take us too far aield. (This is carried out in [11].) Therefore
in this paper we take the third approach, which is to deine a
suitable equivalence relation on open games and then a category
whose morphisms are equivalence classes. This is equivalent to
irst deining a bicategory, and then obtaining a 1-category by
quotienting by invertible 2-cells.
Deinition 5.2. Let G1,G2 : (X , S ) → (Y ,R) be open games. We
write G1 ∼ G2 if there is a bijection i : ΣG1 → ΣG2 such that
• PG1 (σ ,x ) = PG2 (i (σ ),x ) for all x : X and σ : ΣG1
• CG1 (σ ,x , r ) = CG2 (i (σ ),x , r ) for all x : X , r : R and σ : ΣG1
• (σ ,σ ′) ∈ BG1 (x ,k ) if (i (σ ), i (σ
′)) ∈ BG2 (x ,k ) for all x : X ,
k : Y → R and σ ,σ ′ : ΣG1
Proposition 5.3. For each type (X , S ) → (Y ,R), ∼ is an equivalence
relation on the class of open games of that type.
The quotient under ∼ identiies open games with isomorphic
strategy proiles and best responses. This is close in spirit to the
concept of best response equivalence of games in classical game
theory [16, p. 52f], but has some strange consequences. For example,
let G be the scalar open game representing the prisoner's dilemma
from the previous section, with ΣG = {C,D}
2 and (σ ,σ ′) ∈ BG
if σ ′ = (D,D). Now consider a 1-player game with 4 choices
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A = {1, 2, 3, 4} and utility function k : A → R given by k (x ) = x .
Encoding this as a scalar open gameH yields ΣH = A and (σ ,σ
′) ∈
BH if x
′
= 4, since 4 is again a dominant strategy for the player.
Then G ∼ H , and so in the quotient they will be equal elements of
the monoid of scalars, despite the fact that they represent games
with diferent numbers of players. However, this is a technical
consequence of working with an equivalence relation, and does not
happen if we instead use a bicategory or double category of open
games.
Proposition 5.4. ◦ is well-deined on equivalence classes, that is to
say, if G ∼ G′ andH ∼ H ′ thenH ◦ G ∼ H ′ ◦ G′.
Deinition 5.5. For each object (X , S ), the identity open game
id(X ,S ) : (X , S ) → (X , S ) is the function (idX , idS ), that is, the
strategically trivial open gamewith Pid(X ,S ) (∗,x ) = x andCid(X ,S ) (∗,x , s ) =
s .
Proposition 5.6. There is a category Game whose objects are pairs
of sets and whose morphisms are equivalence classes of open games.
The composition is ◦ and the identity on (X , S ) is the equivalence
class of id(X ,S ) .
In the previous section we deined a strategically trivial open
game ( f ,д) : (X , S ) → (Y ,R) given functions f : X → Y and
д : R → S . This deines a functor (−,−) : Set × Setop → Game.
Next we deine the monoidal product of open games, which
corresponds to simultaneous play.
Deinition 5.7. Let G1 : (X1, S1) → (Y1,R1) and G2 : (X2, S2) →
(Y2,R2) be open games. We deine an open game G1 ⊗ G2 : (X1 ×
X2, S1 × S2) → (Y1 × Y2,R1 × R2) as follows:
• The set of strategy proiles is ΣG1⊗G2 = ΣG1 × ΣG2
• The play function is
PG1⊗G2 ((σ1,σ2), (x1,x2)) = (PG1 (σ1,x1), PG2 (σ2,x2))
• The coplay function is
CG1⊗G2 ((σ1,σ2), (x1,x2), (r1, r2))
= (CG1 (σ1,x1, r1),CG2 (σ2,x2, r2))
• The relation
((σ1,σ2), (σ
′
1,σ
′
2)) ∈ BG1⊗G2 ((x1,x2),k )
holds if the relations (σ1,σ
′
1) ∈ BG1 (x1,k1) and (σ2,σ
′
2) ∈
BG2 (x2,k2) both hold, where k1 : Y1 → R1 and k2 : Y2 → R2
are deined by
k1 (y1) = π1 (k (y1, PG2 (σ2,x2)))
k2 (y2) = π2 (k (PG1 (σ1,x1),y2))
Lemma 5.8. ⊗ is well-deined on equivalence classes.
Lemma 5.9. ⊗ deines a bifunctor Game × Game → Game.
Theorem 5.10. Game is a monoidal category in which the monoidal
product on objects is (X1, S1) ⊗ (X2, S2) = (X1×X2, S1×S2) and that
on morphisms is previously deined. The monoidal unit is the object
I = (1, 1).
The structure morphisms of the monoidal category are inherited
from themonoidal category Set×Setop via the functor (−,−), where
Set is cartesian monoidal. Game is moreover symmetric monoidal,
with the symmetry inherited from Set × Setop.
A Lens-theoretic View: A cleaner approach arises if one factors
the deinition of parallel and sequential composition via the use
of lenses. First note that the above deinitions restrict to lenses
meaning that the category of lenses is symmetric monoidal. Just
as open games can be deined in terms of lenses, the categorical
structure of open games can similarly be deined in terms of the
simpler categorical structure of lenses.
Lemma 5.11. Let G : (X , S ) → (Y ,R) andH : (Y ,R) → (Z ,T ) be
open games. Then the compositeH ◦G is the family of lenses indexed
by ΣG × ΣH with the pair (σ ,τ ) indexing the lens
(X , S )
σ
−→ (Y ,R)
τ
−→ (Z ,Q )
Given a state h : (1, 1) → (X , S ) and a costate k : (Z ,Q ) → (1, 1),
then ((σ ,τ ), (σ ′,τ ′)) ∈ BH◦G (x ,k ) holds if (σ ,σ
′) ∈ BG (h,k ◦ τ )
and (τ ,τ ′) ∈ BH (σ ◦ h,k ).
Notice how lens composition hides all the details of how play and
coplay functions knit together in the composite game. In particular,
in the deinition of composition, the function
k ′(y) = CH (τ ,y,k (PH (τ ,y)))
is merely the lens composite k ◦ τ . A similarly simpliied construc-
tion of the monoidal product of open games via the monoidal prod-
uct of lenses can also be given. Observing this vastly simpliies
the proof that open games form a symmetric monoidal category;
compare the direct proof in [9] and the proof using lenses in [11].
6 String diagrams
We will now informally present the string diagram language for
open games. A formal presentation can be found in [10], which
proves a coherence theorem by which we can deine an open game
by its string diagram, given interpretations of the atomic open
games. We refer the reader to [20] for a summary of graphical
languages of this sort. The language of open games is an extension
of those of symmetric monoidal categories, and similar to (but not
exactly) a fragment of compact closed categories.
The key idea of the string diagram language is to treat the object
(X , S ) as a formal tensor product X ⊗ S∗, where −∗ is a duality that
is deined on objects but not on arbitrary open games. Diagrammat-
ically we represent this duality by an orientation on strings, and
thus a general open game G : (X , S ) → (Y ,R) is denoted by
X Y
RS
G
More formally, we allow individual strings to represent covariant
objects of the form (X , 1), and contravariant objects of the form
(1, S ). Then, up to isomorphism, a general object can be written
as a tensor product (X , S )  (X , 1) ⊗ (1, S ) of a covariant and a
contravariant object. If we deine a duality operation on arbitrary
objects by (X , S )∗ = (S,X ), then (X , S )  (X , 1) ⊗ (S, 1)∗. This
justiies the informal statement (X , S ) = X ⊗ S∗, because we can
identify Set with a symmetric monoidal subcategory Set →֒ Game
by identifying X with (X , 1) and f with ( f , id1).
Notice that since we also have (X , S )  (S, 1)∗ ⊗ (X , 1), the open
game G can equally be denoted
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X Y
RS
G
That is, the relative ordering of covariant and contravariant parts
of an object does not matter. More formally, the objects X ⊗ S∗ and
S∗ ⊗ X are equal in the strictiication of Game, and the symmetry
sX ,S∗ is an identity.
Corresponding to each atomic open game we have a correspond-
ing ‘atomic' string diagram, which we compose by the usual opera-
tions of end-to-end and side-by-side juxtaposition. For example, a
utility-maximising decision D : (X , 1) → (Y ,R) corresponds to a
node
X
Y
R
D
If X is a 1-element set, we further restrict this to
Y
R
D
with the usual (purely syntactic) convention of using a triangle for
morphisms into or out of the monoidal unit.
Given a function f : X → Y , its covariant lifting ( f , id1) :
(X , 1) → (Y , 1) and its contravariant lifting (id1, f ) : (1,Y ) →
(1,X ) are respectively denoted
X Yf XY f
This is analogous to the use of rotation for the transpose of a linear
map used by Bob Coecke and others, for example in [3]. While
transposition in a compact closed category is tensor-reversing, i.e.
(X ⊗Y )∗  Y ∗⊗X ∗, for us it is more convenient (ultimately because
our objects are pairs of sets) to have (X ⊗ Y )∗ = X ∗ ⊗ Y ∗, leading
to a notation with relection rather than rotation.
The deleting function X → 1 and diagonal function X → X 2
lift to give a cocommutative comonoid on every covariant object,
and a commutative monoid on every contravariant object. We give
these the special syntax
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
The inal atomic open games that we must give representations
to are the counits εX : (X ,X ) → I . This is denoted by a bending
wire
X
X
Since there is no natural strategically trivial open game I → (X ,X ),
we do not allow wires to bend in the opposite direction in our string
diagrams.
Covariant functions, contravariant functions and counits are
related by the counit law, stating that the string diagrams
X
Y
f
=
X
Y f
denote equal open games. That is to say, the diagram of open games
(X ,Y ) (Y ,Y )
(X ,X ) (1, 1)
( f , id1) ⊗ id(1,Y )
id(X ,1) ⊗ (id1, f ) εY
εX
commutes (where the monoidal structure morphisms are implicit).
Given a diagram built from the pieces we have described, which
does not contain any wire bending in the illegal direction, we can
compositionally build an open game where
• Decision and function nodes are interpreted as the corre-
sponding atomic open game
• Side-by-side and end-to-end composition of diagrams is in-
terpreted as monoidal product and categorical composition
of open games
• A backwards-bending wire is interpreted as the correspond-
ing counit
The coherence theorem for teleological categories [10] states that
the resulting open game is invariant under topological manipula-
tions of the diagram, including rotating function nodes around a
bend using the counit law, provided that the new diagram does not
contain a wire bending in the illegal direction. Several examples
of interpreting a diagram as an open game can be seen in the next
two sections.
7 Simultaneous move games
In this section and the next we will apply the theory of the previ-
ous sections to demonstrate that various classes of games can be
represented as open games and can be built compositionally.
We begin with simultaneous move games. The decision D1,Xi :
I → (Xi ,R) represents an agent who makes a choice from a set Xi
in order to maximise a real number.
Theorem 7.1. Let
G :=
n⊗
i=1
D1,Xi : I →
*
,
n∏
i=1
Xi ,R
n+
-
be a monoidal product of decisions. Then the set of strategy proiles
of G is equal to the set of pure strategy proiles of a simultaneous
move game with sets of choices Xi , namely ΣG =
∏n
i=1 Xi and, for
any function q :
∏n
i=1 Xi → R
n , the relation BG (∗,q) ⊆ ΣG × ΣG
is precisely the best response relation for the simultaneous move game
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D1,X1
D1,X2
q
X1
X2
R
R
R
R
Figure 1. String diagram for simultaneous move game
with outcome function q (and, hence, the ixpoints of BG (∗,q) are the
pure strategy Nash equilibria).
In particular, by the associativity of the monoidal product, the
monoidal product of anm-player and an n-player open game is an
m + n-player open game.
Given a particular utility function q :
∏n
i=1 Xi → R
n , consider
the covariant function
(q, 1) : *
,
n∏
i=1
Xi , 1+
-
→ (Rn , 1)
We take the monoidal product of this with an identity morphism
and then post-compose with a counit, to yield the strategically
trivial open game
*
,
n∏
i=1
Xi ,R
n+
-
(q,1)⊗id(1,Rn )
−−−−−−−−−−−→ (Rn ,Rn )
εRn
−−−→ (1, 1)
By the counit law, this can be equivalently written as
ε∏n
i=1 Xi
◦ (id(
∏n
i=1 Xi ,1)
⊗ (1,q))
Now consider the scalar open game
(1, 1)
⊗n
i=1 D1,Xi
−−−−−−−−−−→ *
,
n∏
i=1
Xi ,R
n+
-
(q,1)⊗id(1,Rn )
−−−−−−−−−−−→ (Rn ,Rn )
εRn
−−−→ (1, 1)
This scalar open game has the property that its best response re-
lation B(∗, ∗), for the unique context (∗, ∗), is precisely the best
response function for the simultaneous move game with outcome
function q.
For small values of n, we can visualise this scalar open game
as a string diagram. For example, when n = 2 the corresponding
string diagram is depicted in Figure 1. Here, for the irst time we
can see how the information low in a game is visualised with a
string diagram: the utility generated by the utility function is ‘fed
back' to each agent via a counit.
The previous results can be strengthened to an arbitrary higher
order game (introduced in Section 2) using the open games Dδ
associated to a selection function from Section 4, in which case
the ixpoints of the best response relation are selection equilibria.
An interesting special case of this is depicted in Figure 2, in which
D1
D2
X
X
X
X
Figure 2. Simultaneous move game with non-utility-maximising
players
the outcome that is ‘optimised' by each player is nothing but the
choice of the other player. (Ignoring the types, this string diagram
arises from Figure 1 by replacing q with a symmetry, i.e. crossing
wires; this provides a nontrivial example of reasoning about the
equivalence of games from topological manipulations of string
diagrams.) Without imposing an order relation on the set of choices,
it is not possible to interpret D1 and D2 as utility-maximising
decisions. Instead, by interpreting D1 and D2 in suitable ways we
can obtain directly analogous results to the Keynes beauty contest
example in [13].
We will consider three diferent ways of interpretingD1 andD2,
which result in three diferent games. If D1 = D2 are both Dix,
where ix : (X → X ) → P (X ) is the selection function ix(k ) =
{x : X | x = k (x )}, the resulting scalar open game is a coordination
game. In particular, if X = {A,B} then the best response relation is
the same as Meeting in New York, the 2-player simultaneous move
game with utility maximising players and outcome function
q(x ,y) =

(1, 1) if x = y
(0, 0) if x , y
In particular, the pure Nash equilibria and the ixpoints of BG (∗, ∗)
are (A,A) and (B,B).
Next, we interpret bothD1 andD2 as the open game lifted from
the anti-ixpoint selection function anti-ix(k ) = {x | x , k (x )}. If
we do this, then the resulting scalar open game G has the same
best response relation as a simultaneous move game with 2 utility
maximising players and outcome function
q(x ,y) =

(0, 0) if x = y
(1, 1) if x , y
This is an anti-coordination game. If X = {A,B} then the pure Nash
equilibria and ixpoints of BG (∗, ∗) are (A,B) and (B,A).
Finally, we interpret D1 = Dix and D2 = Danti-ix. This is a
game in which the irst player would like to coordinate with the
second, and the second would like to diferentiate from the irst.
This has the same best response relation as matching pennies, the
game with outcome function
q(x ,y) =

(1, 0) if x = y
(0, 1) if x , y
This game has no Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
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X
Y
R
X
DX ,Y
Figure 3. Deinition of D∆
X ,Y
8 Sequential games
In the previous section we showed that a simultaneous move game
can be represented as an open game using monoidal products of
decisions. In this section we will represent sequential games, in
which players can observe previous actions of other players before
making their choice.
We focus on the sub-class of inite sequential games from [4]
introduced in Section 2, which are the inite extensive-form games
of perfect information in which at each stage a diferent player
chooses, and the player choosing and the set of possible choices are
determined only by the stage number and not the previous moves.
That is to say, distinct players 1, . . . ,n sequentially make choices
from sets X1, . . . ,Xn , with each player observing every previous
move. Relaxing each of these restrictions is possible but requires
more work (generally, deining additional composition operators on
open games, such as those in [8]), and so we focus on this sub-class
for simplicity.
Recall from Deinition 4.1 that the choice of an element of Y
after observing an element of X by a utility-maximising agent is
modelled by the open game DX ,Y : (X , 1) → (Y ,R) deined by
• ΣDX ,Y = X → Y
• PDX ,Y (σ ,x ) = σ (x )
• CDX ,Y (σ ,x , r ) = ∗
• (σ ,σ ′) ∈ BDX ,Y (x ,k ) if σ
′(x ) ∈ argmaxk
The basic element of a sequential game is the open game D∆
X ,Y
:
(X , 1) → (X × Y ,R) denoted by the string diagram in igure 3.
Algebraically, this is (id(X ,1) ⊗ DX ,Y ) ◦ (∆X , 1), where (∆X , 1) :
(X , 1) → (X ×X , 1) is the lifting of the copying functionX → X ×X .
By applying the deinitions of the composition operators ◦ and ⊗,
the reader can verify that D∆
X ,Y
is concretely given as follows, up
to natural isomorphism:
• ΣD∆
X ,Y
= X → Y
• PD∆
X ,Y
(σ ,x ) = (x ,σ (x ))
• CD∆
X ,Y
(σ ,x , r ) = ∗
• (σ ,σ ′) ∈ BD∆
X ,Y
(x ,k ), where k : X × Y → R, if σ ′(x ) ∈
argmaxy :Y k (x ,y)
Deinition 8.1. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be a sequence of sets. We recur-
sively deine a sequence of open games
Gi : (1, 1) →
*.
,
i∏
j=1
X j ,R
i+/
-
as follows. The base case is G0 = id(1,1) : (1, 1) → (1, 1). In the
recursive step, Gi+1 is deined in terms of Gi and D∏i
j=1 X j ,Xi+1
by
the string diagram in Figure 4.
Gi D
∏i
j=1 X j ,Xi+1
∏i
j=1 X j
Xi+1
R
i
R
∏i
j=1 X j
R
i
Figure 4. Recursive step of deinition 8.1
D1,X DX ,Y
q
X
X
X
Y
R
R
R
R
Figure 5. Example sequential open game with 2 players
Theorem8.2. LetX1, . . . ,Xn be a sequence of sets andq :
∏n
i=1 Xi →
R
n . Let Gn be deined as in Deinition 8.1. Then
ΣGn =
n∏
i=1
*.
,
i−1∏
j=1
X j → Xi
+/
-
is the set of strategy proiles of the n-player sequential game with
outcome function q, and BGn (∗,q) is its best response relation.
For example, a 2-player sequential game with outcome function
q : X ×Y → R2 corresponds to the open game depicted in Figure 5.
This game has a set of strategy proiles Σ = X × (X → Y ), and the
best response relation B ⊆ Σ × Σ is deined by (σ ,σ ′) ∈ B if σ ′1 ∈
argmaxx :X (q(x ,σ2 (x )))1 and σ
′
2 (σ1) ∈ argmaxy :Y (q(σ1,y))2.
We close this section by combining simultaneous and sequential
elements. Consider the open game in Figure 6. The game depicts a
situation where a player irst makes a decision (D1,X ). This deci-
sion is observed by two players who move simultaneously (DX ,Y1
and DX ,Y2 ). As they move simultaneously they cannot observe
each others' moves; they do observe the irst player's move though.
A possible economic story is: two companies use the same input
produced by a monopolist, the irst player, who sets a price for the
input. For example the latter players could be rival car manufac-
turers, and the irst player a monopolist who produces tyres. Upon
observing the price, both competitors decide how much to produce.
Proits result accordingly.
The example illustrates how compositionality can be applied
to economic strategic situations. Modelling economic interactions
compositionally is very natural because the object itself is a com-
position of elements: A market is composed of competitors, buyers,
upstream input providers etc. A situation such as this hybrid simul-
taneous/sequential game is typically modelled as an extensive form
game of imperfect information. We suggest that the representation
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D1,X
DX ,Y1
DX ,Y2
q
X
X
X
Y1
Y2
R
R
R
R
Figure 6. Hybrid sequential-simultaneous move game
as an open game, as well as being modular, is a more appropriate
representation of the underlying economic situation.
9 Conclusions and future work
The broader goal of the compositional theory of games started in
this paper is to bring the full force of compositionality to economic
modelling. In this paper, we have made an important initial step by
showing that a compositional theory is possible. We have focused
only on simultaneous and sequential games, on Nash equilibria as
the solution concept, and have considered only pure strategies. Of
course, there are many more interesting questions to pursue.
First, an important class of games are repeated games, where
players engage in an interaction more than once, and especially
ininitely repeated games. See [8] for initial results including the
construction of inal coalgebras of certain functors on open games
which can be used to model ininitely repeated games and thereby
bring the powerful concept of bisimulation to bear on ininite
games.
Secondly, the solution concept of Nash is built into the deini-
tion of an open game. It is important to consider alternatives. One
categorically attractive point of view is pursued in [11] where open
games are taken as objects of a category and morphisms between
them are studied. This is particularly important if we want to deine
open games, or operators on open games, by universal properties.
Thirdly, applications of game theory very commonly use mixed
(probabilistic) strategies, since there are games, such as matching
pennies, without a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Thus, it
is important to consider open games with mixed strategies. This
is possible but surprisingly di cult, and requires some heavier
category-theoretic tools, and is work in progress. A related ex-
tension concerns games of incomplete information where some
players do not have access to all relevant informations, for instance
other players' utilities. Coalgebras are a natural way to study this
extension [15].
Fourthly, an important practical question is how open games can
be implemented and solved. Various hardness results in algorithmic
game theory [17] state that approximating solutions of arbitrary
games is computationally hard but this is usually given for classical
and ‘monolithic' games such as normal-form games, without ex-
ploiting a formally deined composed structure. On the other hand,
solution algorithms for economic models usually combine various
numerical and statistical methods like function approximation, root
inding, integration and Monte Carlo methods, see for example [23].
One area where compositional game theory might have a signii-
cant impact is in systematically (functorially) combining numerical
methods in order to exploit the compositional structure of the game
to solve it.
Finally, comparison with the recent paper [7] suggests a deep and
unexpected connection between game theory and deep learning.
The category of open learners from that paper embeds into the
category of open games, a fact that has several potential applications
such as to strategy learning and generative adversarial networks.
References
[1] Samson Abramsky. 2005. Abstract scalars, loops, and free traced and strongly
compact closed categories. In Proceedings of CALCO’05 (Lectures notes in computer
science), Vol. 3629. 1ś29.
[2] Achim Blumensath and Viktor Winschel. 2013. A Compositional Coalgebraic
Semantics of Strategic Games. (2013). arXiv:1712.08381.
[3] Bob Coecke and Aleks Kissinger. 2017. Picturing quantum processes. Cambridge
University Press.
[4] Martin Escardó and Paulo Oliva. 2011. Sequential games and optimal strategies.
Proceedings of the Royal Society A 467 (2011), 1519ś1545.
[5] Martin Escardó and Paulo Oliva. 2012. Computing Nash equilibria of unbounded
games. Proceedings of the Turing centenary conference (2012).
[6] Brendan Fong. 2016. The algebra of open and interconnected systems. Ph.D.
Dissertation. University of Oxford.
[7] Brendan Fong, David Spivak, and Rémy Tuyéras. 2017. Backprop as functor: A
compositional perspective on supervised learning. (2017). arXiv:1711.10455.
[8] Neil Ghani, Clemens Kupke, Alasdair Lambert, and Fredrik Nordvall Forsberg.
2018. A compositional treatment of iterated open games. (2018). To appear in
Sannellabration!, special issue of Theoretical computer science.
[9] Jules Hedges. 2016. Towards compositional game theory. Ph.D. Dissertation.
Queen Mary University of London.
[10] Jules Hedges. 2017. Coherence for lenses and open games. (2017).
arXiv:1704.02230.
[11] Jules Hedges. 2017. Morphisms of open games. (2017). arXiv:1711.07059.
[12] Jules Hedges, Paulo Oliva, Evguenia Shprits, Viktor Winschel, and Philipp Zahn.
2017. Higher-order decision theory. In Algorithmic Decision Theory (Lecture
Notes in Artiicial Intelligence), Jörg Rothe (Ed.), Vol. 10576. Springer, 241ś254.
htps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_17
[13] Jules Hedges, Paulo Oliva, Evguenia Shprits, Viktor Winschel, and Philipp Zahn.
2017. Selection equilibria of higher-order games. In Practical aspects of declaritive
languages (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), Yuliya Lierler and Walid Taha
(Eds.), Vol. 10137. Springer, 136ś151.
[14] Kevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav Shoham. 2008. Essentials of game theory: a concice,
multidisciplinary introduction. Morgan and Claypool.
[15] Lawrence S. Moss and Ignacio D. Viglizzo. 2004. Harsanyi Type Spaces and Final
Coalgebras Constructed from Satisied Theories. Electronic Notes in Theoretical
Computer Science 106 (2004), 279 ś 295. Proceedings of the Workshop on
Coalgebraic Methods in Computer Science (CMCS).
[16] Roger B. Myerson. 1991. Game theory: analysis of conlict. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press USA.
[17] Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay V. Vazirani. 2007. Algo-
rithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA.
[18] Dusko Pavlovic. 2009. A semantical approach to equilibria and rationality. In
Algebra and coalgebra in computer science (Lectures notes in computer science),
Vol. 5728. Springer, 317ś334.
[19] Matthew Pickering, Jeremy Gibbons, and Nicolas Wu. 2017. Profunctor optics:
Modular data accessors. The art, science and engineering of programming 1, 2
(2017).
[20] Peter Selinger. 2011. A survey of graphical languages for monoidal categories.
In New structures for physics, Bob Coecke (Ed.). Springer, 289ś355.
[21] Michael Shulman. 2010. Constructing symmetric monoidal bicategories. (2010).
arXiv:1004.0993.
[22] JanWillems. 2007. The behavioural approach to open and interconnected systems.
IEEE Control Systems 27, 6 (2007), 46ś99.
[23] Viktor Winschel and Markus Krätzig. 2010. Solving, Estimating, and Selecting
Nonlinear Dynamic Models Without the Curse of Dimensionality. Econometrica
78, 2 (2010), 803ś821.
